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INTRODUCTION 
 
The clamour of voices crying out for reform of the law relating to 
financial provision on divorce is regularly heard. The judiciary, the academic 
community, lawyers and prospective divorcees have all expressed concern 
about the problematic nature of the current law and the urgent need for 
change.
1
 Yet these same voices rarely draw attention to the major defects 
inherent in divorce law itself. The battle for divorce reform which dominated 
the family law debate during the latter part of the 20th century appears to have 
been abandoned, along with the decision in 2001 by Lord Irvine of Lairg, the 
then Lord Chancellor, not to bring into force the major reforms to divorce law 
contained in Part II of the Family Law Act 1996 (see below). There is now an 
uneasy and, for the most part, a silent acceptance that the majority of spouses 
who want to bring their relationship to a legal end will find a way of doing so. 
The fact that they might have to resort to a massaging of the law, which may 
at times border on outright dishonesty, to secure their freedom and the right to 
embark on a new legal relationship, is largely ignored. Indeed in many family 
law textbooks and family law courses, the topic of divorce is barely discussed. 
It is viewed as an administrative process with little legal content to it. The few 
cases which do come before the courts are given similar scant treatment, even 
when they draw attention to the fundamental problems in the current law, a 
law which is both outdated and confusing. 
This is not a satisfactory state of affairs. It is time that the long overdue 
reform of divorce law be (is) placed back on the Parliamentary agenda. With 
the advent of marriage for civil partners expected in the near future, changes 
will have to be made to divorce law to accommodate these couples. For 
instance, there is no concept of adultery in the law relating to the dissolution 
of civil partnerships. It would therefore be an appropriate moment for a 
                                                   
1 See eg N Shepherd “Ending the Blame Game: Getting No Fault Divorce Back on the 
Agenda” (2009) Family Law 122; E Hasson “Setting a Standard or Reflecting 
Reality” (2003) Intl J Law Policy and the Family 338; G Langdon-Down “Divorce 
Law Reform: Doing the Splits” (2006) Law Society Gazette 20.  
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complete overhaul of divorce law to be undertaken, rather than a piecemeal 
tinkering with it, to resolve such an anomaly.  
 
THE CURRENT LAW OF DIVORCE 
 
In 2003, Wilson J maintained that: 
 
“In England and Wales divorce is not yet simply available upon joint 
demand immediately following a separation”2  
 
Theoretically, this statement may be correct but, in the critique of the current 
law below, it will be seen that many spouses are able to obtain a divorce 
because they both wish it, although they may have to go through a series of 
complex, oppressive and, at times, bizarre and illogical hoops to achieve their 
aim. 
 
The One Year Rule 
 
No matter how distressed a spouse is at the state of the marriage, no 
petition for divorce can be brought before one year has elapsed from the date 
of the marriage.
3
 This provision is based on the belief that marriage is an 
important institution which provides stability for the couple, their children, 
and for society. To allow an early exit, it is argued, would be to trivialise and 
undermine the institution. There are no exceptions to the rule even where a 
spouse is violent or turns out to be a criminal, or a fraudster with respect to an 
essential aspect of the relationship. There are circumstances where the rule 
can produce serious hardship although, of course, there is nothing to prevent a 
spouse from moving out of the family home and living separately until 
divorce becomes possible. 
 
One Ground for Divorce - Five Facts 
 
As most readers will be aware, there is only one ground for obtaining a 
divorce; s 1(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (the 1973 Act) provides 
that the relationship must have broken down irretrievably. However, it is 
insufficient to simply declare that this is so. The breakdown must be 
evidenced by one of the five facts in s 1(2) of the 1973 Act. Even where it is 
self-evident that the relationship has no future, the petitioner must still 
                                                   
2 
Bhaiji v Chauhun [2003] 2 FLR 485, at para [20].
 
3 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 3(1). 
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establish one of the relevant facts. This has led to a common, but 
understandable, erroneous belief that the facts are the grounds for divorce.  
Most partners will be able to find at least one of the facts, even if it may 
require a little imagination, some ingenuity, a significant expenditure of 
emotional energy, and, in some cases, money. There is no necessity to give 
any real evidence of the fact; a mere statement of its existence is sufficient. 
Because the divorce process is primarily an administrative one, it rarely 
involves the spouses in a court appearance. The forms are filled in by the 
petitioner 
4
 or her lawyer and sent to the court where a judge will check them 
before agreeing to the grant of a decree. This means that it will be exceptional 
for a judge to challenge a petition unless fraud is suspected.
5
 Of course, it is 
always possible, but also most unusual, for a respondent spouse, to challenge 
the petitioner‟s statement and defend her request for a divorce. If he decides to 
do so, he is highly unlikely to succeed. The two decisions on defended 
divorce, discussed below illustrate this. 
Rather illogically, the fact on which the petitioner relies need not be the 
cause of the breakdown of the relationship. In many cases, the fact may well 
be the symptom of the breakdown rather than its cause. 
Where a petitioner is able to establish the existence of one of the relevant 
facts, it is still open, although admittedly unlikely, for a judge to decide that 
the marriage remains viable and decline to grant the order requested. If a 
respondent spouse defends the petition the judge will, inevitably, have to 
decide on both the reality of the fact pleaded and the viability of the 
relationship.  
Divorce in England and Wales is primarily a fault-based process. Three of 
the five facts require the petitioner to accuse her spouse of a „matrimonial 
offence‟. This perpetuates the idea that relationship breakdown involves a 
perpetrator of harm and a victim. In reality, when relationships reach the point 
of breakdown, it is commonly acknowledged that it is, more often than not, 
the fault of both spouses or of neither. Many relationships simply reach the 
end of their natural life.  
It is important to note that two of the three fault-based facts make it 
possible for a rapid exit to be made from the marriage - as little as three 
months in many cases. For those who view speed as an essential, there may be 
                                                   
4 Throughout this article, to make for easier reading, the petitioner is referred to using 
the female gender and the respondent using the male gender; this approach also 
reflects the fact that more petitioners are women. 
5 See eg Bhaji v Chauhan above n 3, where the judge became aware that the 
marriages had been entered into for immigration reasons and once visas had been 
obtained, petitions were brought to end the marriages. 
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a temptation to plead one of these facts even though it may necessitate 
collusion with a respondent spouse or, maybe, even to indulge in a little 
judicious exaggeration. Occasionally spouses have made totally bogus 
claims.
6
  
 
 Adultery 
 
The first of the fault-based facts is adultery; s 1(2)(a) of the 1973 Act 
requires that the respondent spouse has committed adultery and that the 
petitioner finds it intolerable to live with him. The petitioner need not give 
specific details of the adultery or give the name of the adulterer. Gone are the 
days of camera bearing private detectives following maids, delivering 
breakfast to the hotel room, to capture images of adulterous couples in bed. 
The petitioner relying on adultery has an additional task, imposed by case law, 
of stating that it is intolerable to live with the respondent for some reason 
other than the adultery.
7
 This is an unfortunate and almost certainly incorrect 
gloss on the statute. 
If the spouses live together for longer than six months following the 
adultery, the petitioner will be deemed not to find it intolerable to live with 
the respondent.
8
 She will be unable to rely on the adultery fact unless, of 
course, the adultery is repeated. 
If marriage between same-sex partners is legalised, the adultery fact 
would almost certainly have to be abandoned. It is hardly possible that a 
differential standard could be applied to heterosexual and same-sex spouses. 
 
 Behaviour 
 
The second fault-based fact is behaviour; s 1(2)(b) of the 1973 Act, 
provides that the respondent must have behaved in such a way that the 
petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. It is the 
fact which is most commonly relied on to prove irretrievable breakdown of 
the relationship. Past decisions have emphasised that it is not the respondent‟s 
behaviour which must be unreasonable but, rather, the expectation that the 
petitioner should continue to live with the respondent‟s behaviour.9 In spite of 
                                                   
6 Ibid, at para 20 where the judge said: “This unusual hearing has exposed a concerted 
attempt to bypass the requirements of the present law and by the use of bogus 
allegations of behaviour to secure the immediate dissolution of marriages which have 
outlived their perceived usefulness” 
7 Cleary v Cleary [1974] 1 WLR 73. 
8 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 2(1)(2). 
9 See eg Bannister v Bannister (1980) Fam Law 10. 
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this, the second of the five facts is referred to regularly as „unreasonable 
behaviour‟.10 
In Livingstone-Stallard v Livingstone-Stallard,
11
 Dunn LJ suggested a test 
which was both subjective and objective. He maintained that the correct 
question to ask was 
 
“… would any right-thinking person come to the conclusion that this 
husband has behaved in such a way that this wife cannot reasonably 
be expected to live with him, taking into account the whole of the 
circumstances and the characters and personalities of the parties?”12 
 
More recently this fact has been subverted to include behaviour on the 
part of the respondent if it can be seen as provoked by the petitioner. For 
example, in 2002 in an unreported decision, a 75 year old husband petitioned 
for divorce because his wife of 50 years reacted publicly and violently 
towards the news that he had been living a double life for more than ten years. 
He had a long-term mistress and child with whom he lived for part of the 
week and returned home to his wife at weekends. The wife, on discovering 
the affair, made malicious phone calls, contacted the press and spread the 
word noisily, and widely, about her husband‟s behaviour. However, she did 
not want the marriage to end at this late stage in her life - she was aged 
seventy-four - and was not prepared to petition for divorce herself.  
The judge granted the husband a decree and said: 
 
“I am satisfied that the respondent has been so overwhelmed by her 
hurt and outrage at the deception that she went over on to the attack in 
order to destroy the petitioner and his second family unit. However, 
no legitimate anger can reasonably lead to the conduct of the kind 
committed by the respondent. I am completely satisfied that the 
respondent‟s attitude was one of aggressive retaliation. The husband 
ruptured the marriage but the respondent, by her behaviour and 
attitude, caused the irretrievable breakdown. The question I have to 
ask myself is: would any right-thinking person come to the conclusion 
that this wife has behaved in such a way that this husband cannot be 
reasonably expected to live with her. To me the answer is undoubtedly 
yes. Apart from her family and close friends, there was no need for 
anyone to know about the family tragedy and certainly there was no 
                                                   
10 See Savva v Savva [2012] EWCA Civ 579, at para 1. 
11 [1974] Fam Law 47. 
12 Ibid, at 54. 
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need for her to spread the news . . . unless her aim was to wound and 
humiliate.”13 
 
It was a hard decision in both its practical and emotional effect on the wife 
and once again demonstrates that two of the three fault-based facts do, in 
effect, provide for divorce on demand.  
If the petitioner lives with the respondent for longer than six months, she 
will not be able to rely on the behaviour complained of in any future petition. 
She will be deemed to have shown that she is able to tolerate her spouse‟s 
conduct.
14
 
It is readily understandable why the behaviour fact is so frequently relied 
on in petitions. The nature of living in an intimate relationship is almost 
certain to give rise to behaviour which is irritating. It is arguable that the 
majority of partners could point to examples of behaviour which they could 
not reasonably be expected to tolerate. The possibility of relying on this fact, 
and achieving a rapid exit from the marriage, may lead encourage spouses to 
search through the dirty linen basket and parade one or more of its contents 
which is hardly likely to permit a civilised end to a relationship, or encourage 
cooperation in the upbringing of their children. 
 
 Desertion 
 
The third of the fault-based facts is desertion. Petitions based on this fact 
are rare; the provision is positively Byzantine. Section 1(2)(c) of the 1973 Act 
provides that the petitioner must be able to prove that the respondent has not 
lived in the same household as her for two years, has no justifiable reason for 
living apart, and had the intention to remain permanently apart from him or 
her throughout that period.  
A spouse may be found to have deserted the petitioner even if they both 
continue to live under the same roof but separately - not an easy task to 
achieve in a small house and most difficult to prove.
15
 There can be no 
desertion if the petitioner‟s conduct has in some way caused the respondent‟s 
departure or she has agreed to his departure. Where the respondent volunteers 
to return to the petitioner before the two years has elapsed and she refuses, 
without good reason, to resume living together, she will be held to be in 
desertion. It is not difficult to understand why a petitioner may feel unable to 
take back her deserting spouse. Trust may well have been lost but her refusal 
to comply with the respondent‟s request will mean that she can no longer end 
                                                   
13 The Times, 1 September, 2000. 
14 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 2(3). 
15 See Le Brocq v Le Brocq [1964] 1 WLR 1085. 
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the relationship in reliance on her husband‟s original desertion. She may find 
that her husband will be able to reverse positions with her, become the 
petitioner and rely on his wife‟s desertion to obtain a divorce.  
The deserting respondent does not have to communicate his intention to 
desert to the petitioner. This gives the petitioner the difficult task of 
discovering at what point the respondent who left without an intention to 
desert subsequently acquired one. Where a respondent who had the intention 
to desert but prior to the elapse of the two year period becomes mentally 
incapable of continuing with that intention, at the end of the two year period, 
he may be deemed to have held the intention for the requisite period of time.
16
 
It may be the only way in which a petitioner can be helped but such deeming 
may seem a little unreal to many spouses who do not have familiarity with the 
Jesuitical ability of lawyers.  
If the deserting spouse returns and is accepted back by the petitioner for a 
period longer than six months, the desertion is deemed to have ended. If the 
respondent returns for less than six months, the petitioner may still rely on the 
desertion but the period of resumed cohabitation does not count towards the 
requisite two year period.
17
 
 
 The Fault-Free Facts 
 
Those spouses who wish to divorce but believe that they live in fault free 
relationships, or who do not wish to maintain that they are victims of a 
matrimonial offence, have two other options open to them: living apart for 
two years with an agreement to end the relationship or living apart for five 
years without such an agreement. 
 
 Two Years Apart and Agreement 
 
Section 1(2)(d) of the 1973 Act provides that a petition for divorce may be 
brought if the petitioner and the respondent have lived apart for two years and 
they both consent to divorce at the end of that period. This fact provides for a 
non-acrimonious and private end to the marriage. All the royal divorces 
during the latter part of the 20
th
 century were based on this fact. 
As with desertion, the parties may live under the same roof during the 
two-year period but they must conduct separate households.
18
 This is 
obviously easier to achieve in a royal residence than in the homes of most 
                                                   
16 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 2(4). 
17 Ibid, s 2(5). 
18 Ibid, s 2(6). 
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potential divorcees. The case law has tended not to take into account the 
realities of everyday life.
19
 During times of economic recession, and where the 
couple have children, it will often be difficult to maintain two separate 
households. It may be essential and more civilised to share the practical every 
day arrangements such as cooking, eating and laundry. In every other way the 
spouses may well be living apart.  
The petitioner must state the date on which she and the respondent began 
living apart and give the reason for doing so. It is not necessary to show that 
there was a matrimonial fault of some sort which precipitated that decision. 
The petitioner must also state the circumstances in which she concluded that 
the marriage was at an end.  
The courts have rather controversially imported an additional requirement 
into s 1(2)(d) of the 1973 Act. In Santos v Santos
20
 for example, it was held 
that the two year period only commences when one spouse recognises that the 
marriage is at an end although it is not necessary to communicate that 
realisation to the other spouse. Such an approach could mean hardship for 
those spouses who separate on a trial basis and do not discover that the 
marriage is at an end until the two years have elapsed. It fails to recognise the 
imprecise nature of human relationships. Partners who have decided to live 
apart may continue to harbour a faint hope that their relationship may not be 
finally over. Often it is only when one spouse wishes to enter into a new legal 
relationship that there is an acceptance that the marriage is truly at an end.  
Although the decision in Santos has not been strictly adhered to, the 
spouses must at least form an intention to live apart at the beginning of the 
two-year period and continue to live apart until they give their consent to the 
grant of the decree at the end of the two years. 
If the spouses move back to live with each other for more than six months, 
they must recommence the two year period of living apart afresh. If they 
resume living together for less than six months and wish to proceed with the 
divorce, the time together will not count towards the requisite two years. 
21
 
In spite of some of the uncertainties of what it actually means to live apart 
for two years, it would seem that this is the most civilised of all the ways of 
ending a relationship. It gives the spouses time to consider whether they really 
do wish to end their marriage. It allows them to plan for their future and that 
of any children of the relationship. 
  
                                                   
19 See eg Mouncer v Mouncer [1972] 1 WLR 321, cf Fuller v Fuller [1973] 1 WLR 
730. 
20 [1972] Fam 247. 
21 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 2(5). 
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 Five Years Living Apart 
 
Petitioners who are unable to rely on any other fact have to rely on what is 
often referred to as the fact of last resort - living apart for five years.
22
 This 
fact is not, as has been suggested,
23
 a Casanova‟s charter for men wishing to 
divorce their innocent wives unilaterally. The majority of those who rely on 
this fact are women.  
The spouses may resume living together for a period of six months. If they 
remain together for longer, and the relationship subsequently breaks down, the 
five years must start afresh. If they live together and part before the six 
months has elapsed, they may not count the time spent together towards the 
requisite period of five years.
24
 
There is no requirement that the respondent must consent to the decree but 
he may attempt to prevent the divorce by pleading the defence of grave 
hardship.
25
 This defence allows a respondent to claim that a decree will result 
in grave financial or other hardship to him and that it would in all the 
circumstances be wrong to grant the decree. The judge has a wide remit to 
take into account such matters as the conduct of both spouses, their interests 
and those of any children, or other persons concerned. 
Grave hardship of both an emotional and a financial nature is almost 
inevitable on relationship breakdown but the type of hardship envisaged by 
the 1973 Act is more than that. The hardship must flow from the divorce 
decree rather than the breakdown of the relationship. Case law reveals how 
difficult it is to prove the relevant connection. The defence has been used 
primarily as a bargaining tool by respondents; they have threatened to plead 
the defence in return for a larger financial settlement. Now that pension 
sharing is possible on divorce, the defence has been reduced significantly in 
importance. 
No respondent who has pleaded non-financial grave hardship has ever 
succeeded in preventing the grant of a decree. In Banik v Banik,
26
 the court 
rejected the respondent‟s claim that her community would ostracise her and 
she would never be able to re-marry. It said that she would have had to:  
 
                                                   
22 Ibid s 1(2)(e). 
23  R Deech “Divorce and Empirical Studies” (1990) LQR 229; R Deech “Divorce a 
Disaster (2009) Family Law 1049. 
24 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 2(6). 
25 Ibid s 5. 
26 [1973] 3 All ER 45.   
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“...satisfy the court that it would be a real hardship to her if the 
marriage was dissolved, not just something which made her unhappy 
or distressed her, or which she regarded personally as immoral or 
contrary to the rules of her community.”27 
 
Even if a respondent is able to clear the difficult hurdle of proving grave 
hardship, the court retains a discretion whether or not to grant the decree. It 
has to balance out the hardship to the respondent if the decree were to be 
granted against the injustice to the petitioner if it were to be refused.
28
 The 
decision in Julian v Julian
29
 is one of the rare cases in which the court 
declined to grant a decree. It held that it would not be wrong to prevent the 
petitioner, who was unwell, from the possibility of remarrying. His wife, who 
was also ill, was found to be more in need of protection from financial 
hardship which would be the consequence of the grant of the decree.  
 
Reconciliation 
 
The current legislation pays lip service to the possibility of rescuing 
relationships. Section 6(1) of the 1973 Act
30
 provides that solicitors must state 
whether they have discussed reconciliation with a client who has sought 
divorce advice and whether she has been given information about agencies 
which may be able to help. It is unknown how many relationships have been 
saved by these provisions but it is assumed very few. The provisions have 
been criticised as being ineffectual and paternalistic. 
 
Defended Petitions 
 
Although few respondents attempt to defend a petition, the ones who have 
tried to do so have been most unsuccessful. If one partner wants a decree of 
divorce, no matter how desperate a respondent is to save the marriage, 
defending the petition is not going to give him what he wants. Rather, the very 
act of defending the petition is likely to be so acrimonious that it will actually 
ensure that the decree will be granted.  
Two important decisions illustrate the likely outcome of defending a 
divorce. 
                                                   
27 Ibid at para 50. 
28 Matrimonial Causes Act, s 5(1)(2)(b); see Brickell v Brickell [1974] Fam 31. 
29 [1972] 116 SJ 763. 
30 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 6, Family Procedure Rules, rule 7.6. 
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In Hadjimilitis (Tsavliris) v Tsavliris
31
 the respondent spouse was a 
wealthy ship-owner who decided to defend his wife‟s petition for divorce; she 
had relied on the behaviour fact. The court found that he had treated his wife 
with criticism and low warmth, controlling and undermining behaviour, 
public humiliation and lack of respect, insight, sensitivity, understanding and 
sympathy. 
As a consequence, she had become depressed and stressed. Her husband‟s 
reaction to this was to demand that she pull herself together. She had no 
financial resources of her own and her husband insisted that she ask him or his 
secretary for money whenever she needed it. He refused to possess a key to 
the family home so that at whatever time he arrived home, his wife would 
have to be available to let him in. This allowed him to control her activities 
and ensure he always knew where she was when he was out of the house.  
In defending the petition the husband accused his wife of having been 
unfaithful to him. He claimed that she had merely married him for financial 
reasons; had not supported him either emotionally or practically; was a bad 
mother, and a drug taker.  
The court held that such accusations merely confirmed the wife‟s 
statements about her husband‟s behaviour. They so undermined the 
relationship that no one could be expected to live with a husband who made 
such allegations. The wife was granted her decree. 
In Savva v Savva
32
 the husband, a chartered surveyor aged sixty four, 
attempted to prevent his wife, a biology teacher aged fifty eight, from 
divorcing him. The couple had been married for thirty four years. The wife 
had petitioned for a decree of divorce in reliance on the behaviour fact. Mr 
Savva maintained that his wife had acted angrily and hastily in petitioning for 
divorce. He maintained that he had not exhibited unreasonable behaviour and 
that his marriage had only temporarily broken down. He claimed that his wife 
had suffered a breakdown and was confused, otherwise she would not have 
petitioned for divorce or criticised his behaviour. He believed that the court 
should have insisted on psychiatric evidence to show how disturbed she was. 
Furthermore, he suggested that her instability showed that she lacked the 
capacity to instruct a solicitor. He claimed there were practical reasons why 
he and his wife did not share a bedroom. He tried to explain that the house 
was in a mess and his wife needed her own space. 
Mr Savva, argued that the divorce law in England and Wales did not do 
enough to encourage couples to remain married; uncorroborated evidence 
about spousal behaviour was accepted by the court. He urged that a one-year 
                                                   
31 [2003] 1 FLR 81. 
32 [2012] EWCA Civ 579. 
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cooling off period should be introduced to prevent marriages being brought to 
a rapid end without serious thought (as partly envisaged by Part II of the 
Family Law Act 1996), that way, he maintained, a lot of angry women would 
be forced to let their anger abate and consider calmly the future of their 
marriage and their family before resorting to discussions with solicitors.  
The Recorder, Judge Cudby rejected Mr Savva‟s view of the marriage. 
Rather, she found that his wife struck her as upright, honest and, not 
unsurprisingly fed up with all that had been going on in her marriage. She did 
not perceive her as in any way psychiatrically unwell or in need of any 
assistance. 
Judge Cudby expressed the view that it was always hard when one party 
believes that the marriage has ended and the other does not. She commented 
that it was sad that Mr Savva could not accept that his long-term marriage had 
broken down and was seeking excuses rather than facing the truth. 
Nevertheless, she granted Mrs Savva a decree of divorce. Mr Savva sought 
leave to appeal the decision.  
In the Court of Appeal, Mr Savva argued that Judge Cudby should not 
have made findings about his and his wife‟s emotional and mental states 
without the benefit of independent evidence from disinterested parties. He felt 
his wife was unable to give reliable evidence herself about her mental state 
and about the events of the marriage. He also maintained that the Recorder 
had wrongly concluded that the marriage had broken down irretrievably but at 
the same time had questioned the accuracy of the wife‟s evidence on the 
length of time she and her husband had occupied separate bedrooms. The wife 
had maintained that this state of affairs had gone on for at least eight years 
whereas the husband maintained it was only for three years.  
The Court of Appeal confirmed the Judge‟s approach and said that it 
mattered not whether the separate occupation of bedrooms had endured for 
eight or three years, it was clearly symptomatic of the irretrievable breakdown 
of the relationship.  
The husband finally maintained that his wife had not obtained a certificate 
of reconciliation. He thought incorrectly that this document placed an 
obligation on his wife‟s solicitor to point her in the direction of counselling in 
an attempt to save the marriage. Lady Black corrected this view and explained 
that the solicitor is merely required to state that he has mentioned the 
possibility of reconciliation to his client. Lady Black pointed out that it was 
unlikely that a certificate had not been obtained but, in any event, its absence 
would not prevent a petition from being granted once the Judge had found that 
the marriage was no longer viable. She refused to grant the husband leave to 
appeal the grant of the decree. 
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REFORM OF THE LAW 
 
A Previous Attempt to Reform - Family Law Act 1996 Part II 
 
After long debate, Parliament finally enacted Part II of the Family Law 
Act 1996 which introduced the concept of „no fault divorces‟. Spouses were 
to attend information meetings at which they would learn about, inter alia, 
reconciliation, marriage counselling, mediation, the law and lawyers, the 
importance of children‟s welfare, the division of financial assets. Pilot 
schemes of such meetings took place but they were not successful. In June 
1999, the Lord Chancellor decided that the preliminary results of the schemes 
were so disappointing and did not achieve the aim of saving marriages or 
persuading spouses to mediate. The information meetings were viewed as too 
rigidly defined; spouses wanted information appropriate to their own specific 
circumstances. The meetings came too late; marriages were already in a major 
state of decline by the time the spouses attended them. There was also a 
problem in finding sufficient numbers of experienced counselors and 
mediators. When the final evaluation reports became available, the Lord 
Chancellor announced in 2001 that the Act would not be brought into force 
(except for s22 relating to relating to the funding of marriage support services, 
which had already been brought into force and would remain so) and that the 
Government would invite Parliament to repeal it once a suitable legislative 
opportunity arose.
33
 
 
The Way Forward  
 
It is abundantly clear that the current divorce law is confusing, 
misleading, outdated, and excessively legalistic. It is rare for anyone to be 
prevented from obtaining a decree but, for the most part, the law does not 
allow for a calm and civilised end to a relationship. This is particularly so 
where there is no obvious reason, or fault on the part of either partner, for its 
breakdown. Reform is essential.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
33 21 April 2010 HL Deb 17 June 1999, http://www.dca.gov.uk/family/fla/flapt2.htm; 
B Hale “The Family Law Act 1996: Dead Duck or Golden Goose” in S Cretney (ed) 
Family Law: Essays for the New Millennium (Blackwell Synergy, 2000). 
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 Marriage Reform 
 
In spite of the high divorce rate in England and Wales, 
34
 marriage is still 
regarded by the majority of people as the gold standard for stable familial 
relationships. Part of the Government‟s determination to legalise same-sex 
marriage is based on this view. Any attempts to reform the law relating to 
divorce must consider first the law relating to marriage. If marriage is an 
important institution for society as well as for the individual, it must not be 
trivialised or undermined. It is a relationship which should not be undertaken 
without serious thought. At the heart of divorce reform is the need consider 
whether the institution of marriage should be reformed, particularly prior to its 
inception. 
At present, it is not difficult to marry. One may do so without any 
understanding of the relationship contract to which the spouses are giving 
their agreement. They need to understand its legal consequences and 
responsibilities as well as the benefits given to them by the State for agreeing 
to undertaking those responsibilities (it must be acknowledged that many of 
the benefits are given merely for entering into marriage regardless of whether 
the responsibilities of the contract are fulfilled). It must be questioned how 
many of those who embark on marriage understand the precise nature of the 
contract. It is not written down in any positive form, rather, couples are left to 
discover it in piecemeal manner as they journey through their marriage. It is 
usually only when the relationship begins to experience difficulties that the 
spouses learn to their surprise what it is that they unknowingly agreed to (sic) 
during the marriage ceremony. Suddenly, the intricacies of the law and its 
consequences for them become visible. 
Many couples spend a considerable period of time often several years, 
planning their perfect wedding day; little is left to chance; expenditure is 
boundless. But how many of these couples give a similar amount of attention 
to the nature of the relationship into which they are entering? Too often it is 
argued that it would be unrealistic to expect couples who are about to commit 
themselves to each other to contemplate the possibility of problems and the 
legal consequences of them. The proponents of this view believe that all 
couples are entitled to their romantic dreams. They should not have the magic 
of their special day ruined with negative thoughts; spouses will find out soon 
enough what marriage means.  
It would be better if it was compulsory for all couples to consider the 
consequences of the contract of marriage, and to do so prior to making a legal 
                                                   
34 In 2010 the divorce rate in England and Wales increased by 5.7 per cent to 11.1 
divorcing people per thousand married population, compared with 10.5 in 2009 
(Divorces in England and Wales 2011 Office of National Statistics 2011). 
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commitment to each other. One possible way forward would be to demand 
that all couples should have to give notification to a Registrar of Marriages of 
their intention to marry at least three months before the ceremony. At the time 
of notification, they would be provided with written information explaining 
the serious legal implications and responsibilities of marriage, how to legally 
bring it to an end, should they wish to do so at some point in the future, and 
the consequences, including the financial ones, of such an action. Two months 
prior to the wedding, the prospective spouses would each have to sign a 
separate legal document, witnessed by a lawyer, stating that they have read 
the information given to them and that they understand what it means to 
commit to each other in marriage.
35
 These signed statements would be 
deposited with a Registrar of Marriages.  
 
 Divorce Reform 
 
Given the current high divorce rate, it would seem pointless to try to lower 
it by way of a difficult and complex divorce law. It is inevitable that some 
spouses will not want to remain married, and attempting to force them to do 
so is unrealistic. Any law reform must reflect this. A way forward must be 
found which respects the importance of marriage as an institution and allows 
those who wish to exit it to do so responsibly, thoughtfully, and in a civilised 
non-confrontational manner, and not in thoughtless great haste. It is essential 
that any new divorce law must protect, in so far as possible, the couple, their 
children, and society as a whole, from the damaging effects of ending 
relationships. It must be acknowledged that damage-free divorce is probably 
impossible to achieve even if both spouses conclude at the same time that they 
wish to leave the relationship.. Children are never happy at the prospect of 
their parents leaving each other even if they find it difficult to bear the marital 
disharmony which so often precedes the parental decision to part. For the 
majority of spouses, there are serious financial implications on divorce; their 
standard of living will be significantly lower than during the marriage. No ref 
necessary I have said that it is true for the majority of spouses-only the rich 
tend not to suffer 
A civilised divorce law should be time-based and only time-based ; there 
should be no other ground for divorce. A prescribed period of time should 
have to elapse between the decision by a spouse (or both spouses if they are in 
                                                   
35 It may be that those who wish to sign a pre-nuptial financial agreement could also 
be permitted to so at this stage and, thereby exempt themselves from the financial 
provisions imposed by the current law on spouses who divorce - a law which is also 
in urgent need of reform. 
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agreement) to leave the marriage and the grant of the divorce decree. It should 
not be less than one year and not more than two years; eighteen months would 
be an acceptable compromise. A spouse, or both spouses if in agreement, 
would have to sign a simple statement, indicating a wish to end the marriage, 
and deposit it with the Registrar of Marriages. There should be no 
requirement to state or prove that the marriage is no longer viable. It cannot 
be the task of the law to determine whether that is so.  
There would then follow a prescribed period of time, at the end of which a 
petition of divorce would be presented to a judge, accompanied by a statement 
of the couple‟s proposed resolution of their financial affairs and their 
arrangements for the future residence and financial support of any children of 
the marriage.  
The lapse of a period of time prior to the grant of a divorce would reflect 
the importance which the State and society attaches to marriage. It would give 
both spouses time to consider their relationship and either reconsider a 
decision to end it or begin to adapt to the possibility of, and plan for, a new 
future. The prescribed period would permit them to put in place arrangements 
for their children and organise their financial affairs.  
Such a reform has the advantage that there would be no acrimonious 
accusations of fault or arguments about whether the marriage has broken 
down or not, there would simply be the requirement that at least one of the 
spouse wishes to leave the relationship. 
There is always the possibility that a couple, deliberately or otherwise, 
would not make the necessary financial arrangement, or decide on the future 
residence and financial support of the children, within the 18 month period. In 
such cases, the court would have to be involved and a further three month 
period would be given to the couple to resolve any outstanding matters. At the 
end of the three month period, the divorce would normally be granted whether 
or not the spouse‟s arrangements had been finalised. Exceptionally, a judge 
might declare that a decree of divorce could not be given until a couple‟s 
affairs had been resolved satisfactorily. In normal circumstances, to allow the 
process to continue beyond two years would permit a spouse to deliberately 
sabotage the divorce as a bargaining tool to determine a child‟s residence or to 
gain a larger financial settlement.  
There will be critics who are certain to suggest that an eighteen month or 
two year waiting period is too long a time to wait for a divorce, particularly, if 
the spouses are forced to occupy the family home together until the financial 
arrangements have been resolved. Whilst recognising that continuing to live 
together is not easy for a family on the point of break up, the reality is that 
already many spouses have to do precisely that. Even those spouses who 
obtain a rapid divorce in reliance on the adultery or behaviour fact often have 
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to live together whilst they wait to sell the family home or find alternative 
accommodation.  
The advantage of divorce being dependent on the lapse of a period of time 
would ensure that all potential divorces would be treated equally. It would 
prevent people using the adultery or behaviour facts to obtain a decree 
precipitously and remarry rapidly before they have time to process the end of 
their previous marriage and make satisfactory arrangements with respect to 
the responsibilities they took on when they married. It would not, of course, 
prevent people from entering into a new non-marital relationship. 
A different group of critics is likely to claim that the proposal to simplify 
divorce, if enacted, would undermine marriage. It would allow people to leave 
the relationship merely because they wish to do so.  
The reality is that it is clear that the law already permits this although in a 
more convoluted and disingenuous manner and it is time to end this 
unsatisfactory state of affairs. 
